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GLEANINGS 



FROM 



v/ 

DUGALD STEWART'S WORKS. 



OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE DEITY. 



Selected, Prepared and Published 



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ROSS WINAN8. 



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-> U. S. A. 



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BALTIMORE: 
JOHN P. DES FORGES. 

]872 



P. 



iV 



GLEAMGS 

FROM 

DUGALD STEWART'S WORKS. 



OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE DEITY. 

It is scarcely possible to conceive a man 
capable of reflection, who has not, at times, 
proposed to himself the following questions : 
Whence am I? and whence the innumerable 
tribes of plants and of animals which I see, in 
constant succession, rising into existence? 
Whence the beautiful fabric of this universe ? 
and by what wise and powerful Being were the 
principles of my constitution so wonderfully 
adapted to the various objects around me ? To 
whom am I indebted for the distinguished rank 
which I hold in the creation, and for the num- 
berless blessings which have fallen to my lot ? 
And what return shall I make for this profu- 
sion of goodness? The only return I can 
make is by accommodating my conduct to the 



will of my Creator, and by fulfilling, as far as 
I am able, the purposes of my being. But 
how are these purposes to be discovered ? Every 
individual chooses for himself the ends of his 
pursuit, and chooses the means which he is to 
employ for attaining them. Are all these elec- 
tions equally good ? and there is no law pre- 
scribed to man ? I feel the reverse. I am 
able to distinguish what is right from what is 
wrong, what is honorable and becoming from 
what is unworthy, base ; what is laudable and 
meritorious from what is shameful and criminal. 
Here, then, are plain indications of the conduct 
I ought to pursue. There is a law prescribed 
to man as well as to the brutes. The only dif- 
ference is, that it depends on my own will 
whether I obey or disobey it. And shall I 
alone counteract the intentions of my Maker, 
by abusing that freedom of choice which he 
has been pleased to bestow on me by raising 
me to the rank of a rational and moral being ? 

This is surely the language of nature ; and 
which could not fail to occur to every man 
capable of serious thought, were not the under- 
standing and the moral feelings in some in- 
stances miserably perverted by religious and 
political prejudices. 

How callous must be that heart which does 



not echo back the reflections which Milton puts 
into the mouth of our first parent ! 

11 Thou sun — said I — fair light, 
And thou enlightened earth, so fresh and gay, 
And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell, 
Tell, if you saw, how came I thus, how here ; 
Not of myself ; by some Great Maker then, 
In goodness, as in power pre-eminent ; 
Tell me how I may know him, how adore, 
From whom I have, that thus I move and live, 
And feel that I am happier than I know.'' 

In this manner a consideration of the rela- 
tion in which we stand to God must satisfy us 
that it is our duty, or that it is morally right 
we should obey his will, as manifested by that 
inward monitor established by himself as his 
vicegerent in our breast. Our moral powers 
give rise to religious sentiments, and these be- 
come in their turn the most powerful induce- 
ments to the practice of morality. 

When once we have established the existence 
of an intelligent and powerful cause from the 
works of creation, we are unavoidably led to 
apply to him our conceptions of immensity and 
eternity, and to conceive him as filling the in- 
finite extent of both with his presence and his 
power. Hence we associate with the idea of 
God those awful impressions which are natu- 



rally produced by the idea of infinite space, 
and perhaps still more by the idea of endless 
duration. When we speak,, therefore, of in- 
finite power, wisdom, and goodness, our notions, 
if not wholly borrowed from space and time, 
are at least wonderfully aided by this analogy ; 
so that the conceptions of immensity and eter- 
nity necessarily enter into the ideas we form 
of his nature and attributes. 

Important use may also be made of these 
conceptions of immensity and eternity in stat- 
ing the argument for the future existence of the 
soul. For why was the mind of man rendered 
capable of extending its views in point of time 
beyond the limits of human transactions, and 
in point of space beyond the limits of the vis- 
ible universe, if all our prospects are to ter- 
minate here ? — or why was a glimpse of so 
magnificent a scene disclosed to a being the 
period of whose animal existence bears so small 
a proportion to the vastness of his desires ? 
Surely this conception of the necessary exist- 
ence of space and time, of immensity and eter- 
nity, was not forced continually upon the 
thoughts of man for no purpose whatever. And 
to what purpose can we suppose it to be sub- 
servient, but to remind those who make a pro- 
per use of their reason, of the trifling value of 



some of those objects we at present pursue, 
when compared with the scenes on which we 
may afterwards enter ; and to animate us in 
the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, by affording 
us the prospect of an indefinite progression ? 



OF THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE 
DEITY. 

In entering on this subject, we may lay it 
down as a fundamental principle that our ideas 
of the moral attributes of God must be derived 
from our own moral perceptions. It is only by 
attending to these that we can form a concep- 
tion of what his attributes are ; and it is in this 
way we are furnished with the strongest proofs 
that they really belong to him. The power of 
distinguishing right from wrong is one of the 
most remarkable circumstances which raise 
man above the brutes ; to act in conformity to 
this sense of rectitude is the highest excellence 
which man is -capable of attaining ; insomuch 
that, in comparison of moral worth, the most 
splendid intellectual endowments appear insig- 
nificant. The constitution of our nature de- 
termines us to conceive the distinction between 



right and wrong as eternal and immutable ; 
not as arising from an arbitrary accommodation 
of our frame to the qualities of external objects, 
like the distinction between agreeable and disa- 
greeable tastes or smells, but as a distinction 
necessary and essential, and independent of the 
will of any being whatever, — analogous in this 
respect to that between mathematical truth and 
falsehood. We are justified, therefore, in draw- 
ing inferences from our own moral judgments 
with respect to the moral administration of the 
Deity, on the same ground on which we conclude 
that what appears to us to be demonstrably true 
must appear in the same light to all other in- 
telligent beings. And as moral worth is the 
highest excellence competent to our own nature, 
we are justified in ranking moral excellence 
among those attributes of God which more 
peculiarly claim our love and adoration. 

But not to insist on this metaphysical view 
of the subject, it is evident that, if we believe 
that we have derived our existence from the 
Deity, we must ascribe to him in an infinite 
degree all those powers and perfections which 
he has communicated to us, or which he has 
rendered us capable of acquiring. 

From our own imperfect knowledge we must 
ascribe to him omniscience ; from our limited 



power we must ascribe to him omnipotence ; 
and, a fortiori, from our moral perceptions we 
must ascribe to him unerring moral rectitude, 
and goodness unbounded towards his w T hole crea- 
tion. 

In opposition to this mode of reasoning, 
skeptics have frequently urged the impropriety 
of forming a deity after our own image ; and 
have represented the argument I stated for the 
moral attributes of God as arising from the 
same illusion of the imagination which leads 
the vulgar to ascribe to him the human form 
and organs of perception analogous to our own. 

But the comparison is by no means just. 
These is obviously a wide distinction between 
the possession of a power and the being limited 
to the exercise of that power in a particular 
way. The former is always a perfection, the 
latter is a mark of an imperfect and dependent 
being. Thus the possession of knowledge is a 
perfection, and we may venture to ascribe it in 
an infinite degree to the Deity ; but it would 
be rash in us, from what we experience in our- 
selves, to conclude that the Deity investigates 
truth by those slow processes of deduction 
which are suited to the weakness of the human 
faculties. In like manner, although it would be 
absurd to suppose that the Deity hears and sees 



10 

in a way analogous to what we experience in 
ourselves, we may without impiety conclude, 
nay we must from the fact believe, that he pos- 
sesses in an infinite degree of perfection all our 
powers of perception, because it is from him 
that we have received them. " He that made 
the eye, shall he not see ? He that made the 
ear, shall he not hear ? " Not indeed by means 
of bodily organs similar to ours, but in some 
way far above the reach of our comprehension. 

The argument which these considerations 
afforcj for the great and important truth I wish 
to establish at present, is irresistible. Moral 
excellence appears obviously to constitute the 
chief perfection of the human mind ; and we 
cannot help considering the moral attributes of 
God as claiming, in a more especial manner, 
our love and adoration than either his wisdom 
or power. 

With respect to that particular attribute of 
the Deity to which the following reasonings 
more immediately relate, the general argument 
applies with singular force. The peculiar sen- 
timent of approbation with which we regard 
the virtue of beneficence in others, and the 
peculiar satisfaction with which we reflect on 
such of our actions as have contributed to the 
happiness of mankind — to which we may add 



11 

the exquisite pleasure accompanying the exer- 
cise of all the kind affections — naturally lead us 
to consider benevolence or goodness as the 
supreme attribute of God. It is difficult indeed 
to conceive what other motive could have in- 
duced a Being, completely and independently 
happy, to call his creatures into existence. 

In this manner then, without going farther 
than our own moral perceptions, we have a 
strong argument for the moral attributes of God ; 
and this argument will strike us with the greater 
force in proportion to the culture which our 
moral perceptions have received. 

The same observation may be applied to the , 
moral argument for a future state. The effect 
of both these arguments on the mind may be 
in a great measure destroyed by dissipation and 
profligacy ; or — on the other hand — by a 
sedulous and reverential attention to the moral 
suggestions of our own breasts, it may be iden- 
tified with all our habits of thought and of 
action. It is owing to this that, while the 
truths of natural religion are regarded by some 
as the dreams of a warm imagination, they 
command the assent of others with the evidence 
of intuitive certainty. " Be persuaded," says 
Shaftesbury, " that wisdom is more from the 
heart than from the head. Feel goodness, and 
2b 



12 

you will see all things fair and good." " Dwell 
with honesty, and beauty, and order ; study 
and love what is of this kind, and in time you 
will know and love the author/ ' 

Just and comfortable views of Providence, 
and of man's future destination, will lead to the 
true worship of the author of our being without 
supernatural aid. 

Locke says we have a power of doing what 
we will. " If it be the occasion of disorder, it is 
the cause of order, of all the moral order that 
appears in the world. Had liberty been ex- 
cluded, virtue had been excluded with it. And 
if this had been the case, the world could have 
had no charms, no beauties sufficient to recom- 
mend it to him who made it. In short, all 
other powers and perfections would have been 
very defective without this, which is truly the 
life and spirit of the whole creation/ ' 

Now, in so far as happiness and misery 
depend on ourselves, the question with respect 
to the permission of evil is reduced to this : Why 
was man made a free agent? Or, in other 
words, why does not the author of nature make 
his creatures happy without the instrumentality 
of their own actions, and put it out of their 
power to incur misery by vice and folly ? A 
question to which — if it is not too presumptu- 



13 

ous to subject it to our discussion — the two 
following considerations seem to afford a suffi- 
cient answer. 

In the first place, we may observe that per- 
haps the object of the Deity in the government 
of the world is not merely to communicate 
happiness, but to form His creatures to moral 
excellence ; a purpose for the accomplishment 
of which it was absolutely necessary to bestow 
on them a freedom of choice between good and 
evil. This observation is hinted at by Butler 
in the following passage : " Perhaps the Divine 
goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make 
very free in our speculations, may not be a bare 
single disposition to produce happiness, but a 
disposition to make the good, the faithful, the 
honest man happy. Perhaps an infinitely per- 
fect mind may be pleased with seeing His 
creatures behave suitably to the nature which 
He has given them, to the relations in which 
He has placed them to each other, and to that 
which they stand in to Himself, which during 
their existence is even necessary, and which is 
the most important one of all. Perhaps, I say, 
an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with 
the moral piety of moral agents in and for 
itself, as well as upon account of its being es- 
sentially conducive to the happiness of His 
creation.' ' 



14 

A second supposition which may be sug- 
gested in answer to the foregoing question is, 
that perhaps the enjoyment of high degrees of 
happiness may necessarily require the previous 
acquisition of virtuous habits, in which case a 
greater sum of happiness is produced by the 
present order of things than could have been 
gained by any other. Nor is this merely a 
gratuitous supposition ; for we know it from the 
fact that the highest enjoyments of which our 
nature is susceptible, arise from a conscientious 
discharge of our duty, and from the possession 
of those qualities which virtuous habits have a 
tendency to form or to inspire. 

The sufferings produced by vice are on this 
supposition instances of the goodness of God, 
no less than the happiness resulting from virtue. 
The final cause of both is the same, — to pro- 
mote the improvement of our nature ; as it is 
from the same motive of love that an affection- 
ate parent rewards the obedience and punishes 
the disobedience of his child. 

I would add, however, as a necessary limita- 
tion of this remark, that it applies only to those 
slighter deviations from duty which may occa- 
sionally occur in the conduct of men habitually 
virtuous ; for in the case of crimes of a deeper 
dye, and which unfit a man to continue any 



15 

longer a member of society, remorse produces 
the unmixed agonies of despair. 

These observations justify Providence not 
only for the permission of moral evil, but for 
the permission of many things which are com- 
monly complained of as physical evils. How 
great is the proportion of these which are the 
obvious consequences of our vices and preju- 
dices, and which, so far from being a necessary 
part of the order of nature, seem intended, in 
the progress of human affairs, as a gradual 
remedy against the causes which produce them. 
Whatever evils are consequences of vice and 
prejudice are not a necessary part of the order 
of nature. On the contrary, they lead to a 
correction of the abuses from which they spring. 
They warn us that there is something amiss in 
our own conduct or in that of other men ; and 
they stimulate our exertions in the search of a 
remedy, as those occasional pains to which the 
body is liable tend to the preservation of health 
and vigor, by the intimation they give of our 
internal disorders. 

Some of our other complaints with respect to 
the lot of humanity will be found, on examina- 
tion, to arise from partial views of the constitu- 
tion of man, and from a want of attention to 
the circumstances which promote his improve- 
ment, or which constitute his happiness. 



16 

When we compare the condition of man at 
the moment of his first appearance on this scene 
with that of some other animals, he appears to 
be in many respects their inferior. His infancy 
is more helpless, and of much longer duration. 
Most animals are covered with furs, or with 
skins of a sufficient thickness to protect them 
from the inclemencies of the seasons ; and all 
of them are directed by instinct in what manner 
they may choose or construct the most conve- 
nient habitation for securing themselves from 
danger and for raising their offspring. The 
human infant alone enters the world naked 
and exposed, without a covering to the fury of 
the elements, surrounded with dangers beyond 
his ability to cope with. 

Notwithstanding, however, the unpromising 
aspect of his original condition, man has no 
just cause to complain of the bounty of nature ; 
for it is in the apparent disadvantages of his 
condition, in the multiplicity of his wants, and 
in the urgency of his necessities, that the foun- 
dation is laid of that superiority which he is 
destined to acquire over all the other inhabitants 
of the globe. 

The necessity of certain inconveniences in 
our external circumstances, to rouse the energies 
and to improve the capacities of the human 



17 

mind, is strongly illustrated by the compara- 
tively low state of the intellectual powers in 
such tribes of our species as derive the neces- 
saries and accommodations of life from the im- 
mediate bounty of nature. No other explana- 
tion can, I think, be given of those peculiarities 
in the genius of some of the South Sea islanders. 

" The natives of Otaheite, and the adjacent 
Society Isles, are generally of a lively brisk 
temper, great lovers of mirth and laughter, and 
of an open, easy, benevolent character. Their 
natural levity hinders them from paying a long 
attention to any one thing. You might as well 
undertake to fix mercury as to keep their mind 
steady on the same subject. M 

Such, indeed, is the constitution of the human 
mind, that it may be safely affirmed that any 
individual might be fixed through life in a state 
of infantine imbecility, by withholding every 
stimulus to his active exertions, and by gratify- 
ing every want as fast as it arose. 

Nor is the activity of life merely the school 
of wisdom and of virtue to man ; it is the great 
source of his present enjoyment. 

11 The happiness of man when most distin- 
guished, is not proportioned to his external pos- 
sessions, but to the exertion and application of 
his faculties. It is not proportioned to his ex- 



18 

emption from danger, but to the magnanimity, 
courage, and fortitude with which he acts. It 
is not proportioned to the benefits he receives, 
but to those he bestows ; or rather to the candor 
and benevolence with which, as a person oblig- 
ing and obliged, he is ready to embrace his 
fellow-creatures, and to acknowledge or reward 
their merits. 

" The rich and the powerful, say the vulgar, 
are happy, for they are exempted from labor 
and care. Their pleasures come unsought for, 
and without any alloy of pain." 

What do the idle devise to fill up the blank 
of real affairs? Not a bed of repose, nor a 
succession of inert and slothful enjoyments ; 
they devise sports that engage them in labor, 
and toil not less severe than that of the indigent 
man who works for his bread ; and expose 
themselves to dangers not less real than those 
which occur in what are thought the most 
hazardous pursuits of human life. 

For the subjects of those complaints which 
have been now under our consideration, a foun- 
dation is laid in the general laws of nature, and 
in the constitution of the human mind. The 
one is adapted to the other, as the fin of the 
fish is adapted to the water, or the wing of the 
bird to the air ; and if the order of things was 



19 

changed in conformity to our wishes, the world 
would be no longer a scene fitted for such 
beings as inhabit it at present. Our complaints 
are founded in our ignorant conceptions of our 
real good, which lead us to mistake what are in 
truth excellences and beauties in the scheme of 
Providence, for imperfections and deformities. 

The circumstances on which these complaints 
are founded are in some degree common to the 
whole race ; and wherever this is the case, I 
believe it will not be difficult to trace the bene- 
ficent purposes of Providence. 

But what account shall we give of the evils 
produced by what are commonly called the 
accidents of life ; accidents from which no state 
of society, how perfect soever, can possibly be 
exempted ; and which, if they be subservient 
to any benevolent purposes, contribute to none 
within the sphere of our knowledge ? What 
account shall we give of those cruel calamities 
which so often overwhelm individuals, and ag- 
gravate the miseries of their condition so far 
beyond the common lot of humanity? That 
troubles should occur in the life of man we can 
see obvious reasons ; and in fact they do occur 
in a sufficient degree in the life of the most for- 
tunate. But why those awful strokes that so 
often fall on men of inoffensive or virtuous 

3 B 



20 

habits, and who do not seem to stand more in 
need of the school of adversity than many 
around them who enjoy in security all the goods 
of fortune ? 

On such occasions we must no doubt be fre- 
quently forced to acknowledge that the ways of 
Providence are unsearchable, and we must 
strive to fortify our minds by the pious hope 
that the sufferings we endure at present are sub- 
servient to some beneficial plan which we are 
unable to comprehend. In the meantime, it is 
of the utmost consequence for us always to re- 
collect, that accidents of this sort are insepar- 
able from a state of things where the inhab- 
itants are free agents, and where the Deity 
governs by general laws. 

They could not be prevented but by partic- 
ular interpositions, or in other words, by sus- 
pending occasionally the general laws by which 
his administration is conducted. That the evils 
resulting from such suspensions would far out- 
weigh the partial good to be gained from them, 
is obvious even to our limited faculties. 

With respect to these general laws, their 
tendency will be found in every instance favor- 
able to order and to happiness. This observa- 
tion, I am persuaded, will appear, upon an ac- 
curate examination, to hold without any excep- 



21 

tion whatever ; and it is one of the noblest 
employments of philosophy to verify and 
illustrate its universality, by investigating the 
beneficent purposes to which the laws of nature 
are subservient. Now it is evidently from 
these general laws alone that the ultimate ends 
of Providence can be judged of, and not from 
their accidental collisions with the partial in- 
terests of individuals ; collisions too which so 
often arise from an abuse of their moral liberty. 
It is the great error of the vulgar — who are 
incapable of comprehensive views — to attempt 
to read the ways of Providence in particular 
events, and to judge favorably or unfavorably 
of the order of the universe from its accidental 
effects with respect to themselves or their 
friends. Perhaps, indeed, this disposition is in- 
separable in some degree from the weakness of 
humanity. But surely it is a weakness that 
we ought to strive to correct ; and the more we 
do correct it, the more pleasing our conceptions 
of the universe become. Accidental incon- 
veniences disappear when compared with the 
magnitude of the advantages which it is the 
object of the general laws to secure : " or," as 
one author has expressed it, "scattered evils 
are lost in the blaze of superabundant good- 
ness, as the spots on the disc of the sun are 
lost in the splendor of his rays." 



22 

Many of our moral qualities, too, are the 
result of habits which imply the existence of 
physical evil. Patience, fortitude, humanity, 
all suppose a scene in which sufferings are to be 
endured in our own case, or relieved in the case 
of others. 

The argument for the goodness of God which 
arises from the foregoing considerations, will be 
much strengthened if it shall appear farther 
that the sum of happiness in human life far 
exceeds the sum of misery. 

It is of importance to remark how small is 
the number of individuals who draw the atten- 
tion of the world by their crimes, when com- 
pared with the millions who pass their days in 
inoffensive obscurity. 

We may add to this observation, that even 
in those unhappy periods which have furnished 
the most ample materials to the historian, the 
storm has spent its rage in general on a com- 
paratively small number of men placed in the 
more conspicuous stations of society by their 
birth, by their talents, by their ambition, or by 
an heroical sense of duty, while the unobserved 
multitude saw it pass over their heads, or only 
heard its noise at a distance. 

I have spoken of the multitudes who pass 
through life in obscurity, as if their characters 



IS 



were merely inoffensive, and entitled them only 
to a negative praise, whereas it may be reason- 
ably doubted if it is not among them that the 
highest attainments of humanity have been 
made. Much the larger portion of our species 
not destined to come forward on the great 
theatre of human affairs, how meretorious in 
most instances, how exalted in many instances, 
is the general tenor of their conduct! And 
when unusual combinations of circumstances 
have forced even those denominated the weaker 
sex into situations of difficulty and danger, 
what splendid examples of constancy and mag- 
nanimity have they left behind them ! Every 
person, too, who has turned his attention at all 
to the manners of the middle and humble 
classes, and who has studied them with candor, 
must have met, among the many faults that 
may be fairly charged on their education and 
their circumstances, with numberless instances 
of integrity and of humanity which would have 
added lustre to the highest stations. There is 
not a more interesting circumstance mentioned 
in any biographical detail than the emotion 
which Moliere is said to have discovered when 
a common beggar, to whom he had hastily given 
a piece of gold instead of a small copper coin, 
returned and informed him of his mistake. 



24 

These imperfect hints, if they are allowed to 
be well-founded, go far to justify a very pleasing 
idea of Mr. Addison's, that " there are prob- 
ably greater men who lie concealed among the 
species, than those who come out and draw on 
themselves the eyes and admiration of mankind.' ' 
We are dazzled with the splendor of titles, the 
ostentation of learning, the noise of victories, 
while God sees the truly great and good man, 
the philosopher in the cottage, who possesses 
his great soul in patience and thankfulness, 
under the pressure of what little souls call 
poverty and distress. 

The evening walk of a wise man is more il- 
lustrious in the sight of God than the march 
of a general at the head of a victorious army. 
A contemplation of God's works, a voluntary 
act of justice to our own detriment, tears that 
are shed in silence for the miseries of others, a 
private desire or resentment broken or subdued ; 
in short, an unfeigned exercise of humility, or 
any other virtue, are such actions as are glorious 
in the sight of the great searcher of hearts. 

Having dwelt so long on the beneficent ten- 
dency of those laws which regulate the more 
essential interests of mankind, I must content 
myself with barely mentioning, before leaving 
this subject, the rich provision made for our en- 



25 

joyment in the pleasures of the understanding, 
of the imagination, and of the heart. How 
delightful are the pursuits of science, how 
various, how inexhaustible ! How pure, how 
tranquil are the pleasures afforded by the fine 
arts ! How enlivening the charms of social- 
intercourse ! How exquisite the endearments 
of affection ! How sublime the raptures of 
devotion ! The accommodation of our sensitive 
powers to the scene we occupy is still more 
wonderful, inasmuch as over and above the care 
which is taken for the preservation of our 
animal being, and the means provided for our 
intellectual and moral improvement, there ap- 
pears to be a positive adaptation of our frame 
to the earth we inhabit ; an adaptation our 
Maker could destine for no other end but to 
multiply the sources of our enjoyment. Surely 
he might have contrived to enlighten the earth 
without displaying to our view the glories of 
the firmament. The day and the night might 
have regularly succeeded each other without 
our once having beheld the splendor of a morn- 
ing sun, or the glow of an evening sky. The 
spring might have ministered to the fertility of 
summer and of autumn without scattering over 
the earth a profusion of flowers and blossoms, 
without refreshing the eye with the soft verdure 



26 

of the fields, or filling the woods with joy and 
melody. 

" Nor content 
With every food of life to nourish man, 
Thou mad'st all nature beauty to his eye 
And music to his ear." 

14 The whole frame of the universe," says 
Epictetus, u is full of the goodness of God; and 
to be convinced of this important truth, noth- 
ing more is necessary than an attentive mind 
and a grateful heart." 



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LIBRARY OF CONGRES 



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pH 8.5 



